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Abstract
Whereas economic grievance and the political opportunity structure could be the basis for 
understanding Ukrainian youth political participation and institutional trust, to date, no one 
has systematically applied the necessary contextual information to survey data to make this 
claim. To study these topics with survey data, we would need to match this context to the 
specifi c fi eldwork periods in which the survey data was collected. In this article, I match the 
economic and political situations of young adults in Ukraine with the fi eldwork periods of the 
European Social Survey (ESS) from 2004 to 2012. This facilitates the use of ESS to test 
theories of grievance and political opportunity structure. I found that periods of economic 
grievance do not neatly align with trends in participation and trust. The possibility is open 
for the continual low participation and trust to be associated with the political opportunity 
structure provided predominantly by political parties during mass uprisings. 
Keywords: political participation, institutional trust, youth, economic grievance, political 
opportunity structure
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Ukrainian youth today started their adult lives in independent states that began to 
transform its institutions from centrally-planned state socialism to capitalism. The 
shift had resulted in an initial sharp economic downturn, volatility in the region, 
cuts to welfare expenditures, and rising poverty and economic inequality (Böröcz 
2012). During this time, the youth have suffered tremendously from the impacts of 
neoliberal economic transformation ranging from budget cuts on educational and 
social welfare spending to limited labour market access for university graduates 
(Bojcun 2011). The political context during post-socialist transformations was 
unstable. There have been several political upheavals, including the Orange 
Revolution, turn on Western orientations in domestic and external policies 
afterwards, and the return of strong Russian infl uence during the Yanokovych 
regime. After the return of Yanokovych, there has been Euromaidan, a change in 
government, the annexation of Crimea, and a military confl ict in Ukraine.
Some theorists associate the combination of economic restructuring that 
leaves the youth and other disadvantaged groups in greater peril of precarious and 
unstable employment and the constantly shifting political context with low political 
participation and institutional trust in the region (Karakoc 2013; Vrablikova 2014). 
Post-socialist states tend to have lower levels of political participation and trust in 
institutions than the Western established democracies (Teorell et al. 2007; Karakoc 
2013) and trust toward government institutions and formal organisations have 
dramatically declined during post-socialist transformations (Pehlivanova 2009 
p.32). In Eastern Europe, non-institutionalized participation (such as consumer 
participation, protest activity, and contacting offi cials) is linked to political parties 
that act as a mobilizing force (Teorell et al. 2007). 
Economic grievance and political opportunity structure could be the basis for 
understanding of Ukrainian youth political participation and institutional trust, but 
to date, no one has systematically applied the necessary contextual information to 
make this claim. To study these topics with survey data, we would need to map this 
context to the specifi c fi eldwork periods in which the survey data was collected.
In this article, I present the socio-economic and political context for European 
Social Survey (ESS) data 2004–2012, in which Ukraine participates in all rounds. 
How does this context, as it relates to young adults in Ukraine, correspond with the 
ESS fi eldwork periods? Addressing this research question better enables scholars 
to test the explanatory power of grievance theory and political opportunity structure 
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models in the context of youth political participation and trust in Ukraine. This is 
a mixed methods study. After presenting the contexts, I use ESS data to analyze 
trends in participation and trust of Ukrainian youth. I intend for this presentation 
of context and trends during fi eldwork periods to facilitate the use of ESS to test 
theories of grievance and political opportunity structure. 
ESS Fieldwork Periods for Ukraine
Statistical analysis of surveys provides substantial basis for generalization, 
however, this data is limited for understanding specifi c events and processes. 
Apart from these general limitations, it is important to check methodological 
details thoroughly before performing of any statistical analysis as misuse of the 
data could lead to distorted research conclusions. Particularly, as I found in ESS, 
offi cial dates of survey waves could not correspond with the dates of fi eldwork 
periods in certain countries. In this regard, using ESS I locate the respondents’ 
attitudes and behaviours within the fi eldwork period which, at times, differ from 
the offi cial date of the ESS survey. Everyday users of ESS data for Ukraine may 
not consider this issue enough to check if the offi cial date of the data matches when 
the data was reported. Thus, they may not understand the exact context in which 
the data were collected. I assume that the context of the fi eldwork is a primary 
infl uence of how the respondents will answer the survey questions. The dates of 
fi eldwork in Ukraine are presented in the Table 1. 
Table 1. Targeted and Actual Fieldwork Periods of European Social Survey in Ukraine
Ukraine appears 
in Round…
The offi cial date 
of the data is…
Targeted Fieldwork Period 
of ESS as a whole…
The actual fi eldwork period 
for ESS Ukraine was…
2 2004 September 1, 2004 – December 21, 2004
January 28, 2005 – 
March 10, 2005
3 2006 September 1, 2006 – December 21, 2006
December 6, 2006 – 
January 12, 2007
4 2008 September 1, 2008 – December 21, 2008
March 1, 2009 – 
April 2, 2009
5 2010 September 1, 2010 – December 21, 2010
May 13, 2011 – 
July 30, 2011
6 2012 September 1, 2012 – December 21, 2012
July 11, 2013 – 
August 9, 2013
Note: From the European Social Survey website, found in the pages for “Fieldwork Summary and Deviations”. 
Accessed August 2018: https://web.archive.org/web/20180201234934/http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/
data/deviations_index.html
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Fieldwork periods are typically one year after the offi cial dates of the surveys. 
For example, the 2004 data was collected in 2005, and some of the 2006 data was 
collected in 2007, and so on. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Political participation can be defi ned as action by ordinary citizens directed toward 
infl uencing some political outcomes (Teorell et al. 2007). Teorell (2006) defi nes 
three different conceptions of political participation: infl uencing attempts that aim 
to insure equal protection of interests; direct decision making resulting in self-
development and political discussion that results in subjective legitimacy. In this 
article I focus on the conception of infl uencing attempts in operationalization of 
political participation. 
Political trust can be conceptualized as a general assessment by citizens of 
the extent to which actors and institutions within the political system behave 
according to citizens’ expectations (Hooghe & Kern 2015). Post-socialist states 
have the lowest levels of political trust (e.g. trust in country’s parliament, trust 
in the legal system, trust in the police, trust in politicians) in Europe (Hooghe & 
Kern 2015). 
Youth Political Participation and Institutional Trust
To empirically analyze youth participation and trust using ESS data, quantitative 
scholars must defi ne this category with numbers. Defi ning the age interval for 
operationalization of „youth cohort” varies greatly from one research paper to 
another with three main approaches: generational, empirical, and sociocultural. 
Each depend on the methodology and purpose of research. According to 
a generational approach, researchers compare age cohorts who were born and 
socialised in different political and economic contexts. Foa and Munk (2016) 
defi ne the millennial generation as born in 1980 and compares them to their baby-
boomer parents who were born during the fi rst two decades after the Second World 
War. Researchers that analyze changes to the civic and political participation of 
young people also emphasize the generational aspect. Usually defi ned as under 
30 years of age, young generation has many names: “Post-9/11 Generation”, the 
“Millennials”, or the “DotNets” (Fisher 2012).  
The empirical approach to defi ning age brackets depends on selected indicators 
of political participation. In research papers comparing age cohorts by voting 
behaviour, the lower end of the youth age bracket is 18 (McFarland & Thomas 
2006, Carpini 2000, Hart & Hen 2017). Research papers analysing youth activism 
and participation in voluntary organizations defi ne age brackets based on the 
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average membership age of organizations under study (McFarland & Thomas 
2006, Smith 1999, Quintellier 2008). Longitudinal data present an opportunity to 
follow the respondent’s trajectories from before 18 (Smith 1999). The sociocultural 
approach is based on the idea that ‘youth’ is social construct and identifi cation of 
person as young depends on the specifi c context. This approach is more common 
for qualitative studies. For example, Rossi (2009) in his case study of ATTAC 
(Argentina), the Klampun Community of Papua New Guinea, and the World 
YWCA, and Fisher (2012) in her analysis of cases of Obama campaign 2012 
election in US do not strictly defi ne age brackets of their respondents. Considering 
this discrepancy in operationalization of youth and the fact that I use different 
sources of data in this paper (survey data, statistical data, protest event data and 
secondary sources), there are some inconsistencies in age brackets according to 
methodological limitations.
Concept of political participation is operationalized through both institutionalized 
or conventional (electoral) and non-institutionalized or non-conventional (non-
electoral) forms of participation (Teorell et al 2007, Marien et al 2010, Hooghe, 
& Kern 2015). In research on youth political participation conducted in US and 
Western Europe, there is a trend of young people rejecting electoral politics and 
disengaging from public life (Melo & Stockemer 2014; Delli Carpini 2000; Earl 
et al. 2017). The literature classifi es explanations for this tendency into individual 
social background and structural factors. In the literature socio-economic 
background and family practices are defi ned as an independent factor of infl uence 
on youth political participation (Melo & Stockemer 2014) or mediating factor 
that infl uence on participation in voluntary organizations (McFarland & Thomas 
2006). From structural perspective, youth become less politically active and more 
vulnerable category of society in the context of neoliberal policies (Hart and Henn 
2017).
In literature, the youth have been portrayed as apathetic, distrustful and 
unsupportive of democratic institutions, and uninterested in public affairs 
(Albacete 2014). Some argue that youth political participation is changing rather 
than declining. According to Earl et al. (2017) young people are politically active 
and involved in their own political socialization as evident when examining 
noninstitutionalized political participation, e.g. protest and other forms of 
participatory politics. According to Hart and Henn (2017) and Melo and Stockemer 
(2014), while their older contemporaries have maintained engagement with formal 
politics, today’s young are practicing alternative politics, or what Marien et al 
(2010) referred to as non-institutional participation. Individuals born between the 
late 1970s and early 1990s are signifi cantly more likely to engage in forms of 
direct action, such as demonstrations and petitions. 
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Grievance Theory
According to grievance theory, deprivation and grievances stimulate political 
participation and protest behavior particularly (Gamson 1968; Wilkes 2004). 
In his casual model of strife, Gurr (1968) examined 114 polities and proposed 
a psychological variable of relative deprivation as the basic precondition for the 
phenomenon. Relative deprivation is defi ned by Gurr as “‘actors’ perceptions of 
discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions of the 
life to which they believe they are justifi ably entitled) and their value capabilities 
(the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get 
and keep)” (Gurr 1968: 1104). He defi ned strife as “collective, nongovernmental 
attacks on persons or property that occur within the boundaries of an autonomous 
or colonial political unit” (Gurr 1968: 1107). The more widespread and intense 
deprivation is among individuals in society, the greater is the magnitude of strife 
in one or another form. 
In his work Gurr (1968) differentiates between persistent and short-term 
deprivation. Persistent deprivation is operationalized through economic and 
political discrimination (limiting social group’s access to higher economic value 
positions and opportunities to participate in political activities or to attain elite 
positions) as well as potential separatism, dependence on private foreign capital, 
religious cleavages and lack of educational opportunity (Gurr 1968: 1109–1110). 
Short-term deprivation was measured through economic conditions such as 
short-term trends in trade value, infl ation, decline in GNP growth, and adverse 
economic conditions; and through political conditions, such as new restrictions 
on political participation and representation by the regime, new depriving policies 
(Gurr 1968: 1111–1112). Scholars had further developed this theoretical model 
to emphasize that political and economic grievances of deprived individuals and 
groups are a main impetus for political mobilisation (Wilkes 2004). 
Since Gurr, grievance has been operationalized in different ways. Wilkes’ 
(2004) study of First Nation protests in Canada, measured grievance through 
unemployment, which had a signifi cant infl uence on collective action. Dalton 
et al. (2010) with data from 1999–2002 wave of the World Values Survey, 
operationalised grievance through macro-economic factors (GDP per capita, 
changes in GDP, level of income inequality) and psychological factors (average 
life satisfaction, national happiness) (Dalton et al 2010: 64). Ortiz et. al (2013) in 
their study of 843 protest events in 84 countries during 2006–2013 had defi ned 
four main dimensions of sources of grievance: economic justice/anti-austerity, 
failure of political representation and political systems, global justice and rights 
of people. According to Ortiz et al (2013), economic justice and anti-austerity are 
the most numerous type of protests in observed period. Authors emphasise that the 
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reason of their acceleration is the contraction of decent jobs as a result of the global 
crisis and expansion of austerity measures worldwide since 2010. Main categories 
of economic justice/anti-austerity protests are: reform of public services; pension 
reform; jobs, higher wages and labour conditions; tax/fi scal justice; inequality; 
low living standards; agrarian/land reform; fuel/energy prices; food prices and 
housing. According to the study, among the most important grievances of protests 
in Ukraine during this period there are protests against pension reform, protests 
against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and rights-based protests related to 
issue of ethnic justice (Ortiz et al 2013).
Political Opportunity Structure (POS)
Political opportunity structure (POS) theory emphasizes that political opportunities 
is what facilitates grievances as a factor for mobilization.  This theoretical 
model was developed within resource mobilization tradition, according to which 
deprivation and associated grievance are relatively constant (Wilkes 2004: 571). As 
Mayer (2004) argues, the key recognition in the political opportunity perspective is 
that activists’ prospects for advancing particular claims, mobilizing supporters, and 
affecting infl uence are context-dependent. Analysts appropriately direct much their 
attention to the world outside a social movement, on the premise that ‘exogenous 
factors enhance or inhibit a social movement’s prospects for mobilization; advancing 
particular claims rather than others; cultivating some alliance rather than others; 
employing particular political strategies and tactics rather than others, and affecting 
mainstream institutional politics and policy’ (Mayer 2004: 126). A number of such 
factors of POS are defi ned in the literature: traditions and institutions; governmental 
structure; political stability and openness; public policies and government actions; 
political discourse; elite alignment (Meyer & Staggenborg 1996: 1633–1634). 
POS link change in protest activity to changes in the resources available to 
the group or to changes in political opportunities and national conditions (Wilkes 
2004: 572). In her study of citizen activism across 24 old and new democracies 
based on ISSP (2004) data, Vrabikova (2014) argued that in addition to resources, 
motivations and mobilization, institutional opportunities also facilitate individual 
participation in non-electoral politics. Citizen activism is expected to increase if 
opportunities for political participation are open and decrease if citizens believe the 
opportunities for infl uencing public decisions as closed.  Specifi cally, Vrablikova 
(2014) emphasized decentralization of state institutions on the basis of the principle 
of checks and balances as key infl uence on individual non-electoral participation. 
According to her study, decentralization does so because it offers more access 
points to infl uence politics and increasing the opportunities for citizens to have an 
impact on decision-making. In addition, political opportunity structure also plays 
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a second role through increasing the mobilizing effect of social networks on non-
electoral participation (Verbikova 2014: 2). 
Based on the literature on grievance and POS, there appears to be three main 
stages of increase in political participation for youth in Ukraine:
(1)  Deprivation as disadvantaged status of the youth as a result of elites’ 
economic and/or political decisions.
(2)  Grievance – feeling of anger and dissatisfaction as the result of deprivation 
in socio-economic and/or or political conditions.
(3)  Political mobilization – the process of building opportunity structure for 
political participation that could be grassroots and/or imposed from above 
(elites could use grievances for stimulation of youth protests in order to 
satisfy their own political interests).
Thus, the literature suggests that political mobilization could not work without 
substantial feeling of grievance by deprived individuals or groups; at the same 
time, grievance could not be transformed into political action without provided 
political opportunity structure. In light of this, in this article I examine grievance 
and POS together and across time.
POTENTIAL SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GRIEVANCE AND POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE FOR UKRAINIAN YOUTH
In this section I focus on analysis of potential sources of grievance and political 
opportunity structure for youth political participation in Ukraine during 2004–
2013. Analyzing sources of grievance, I consider the economic situation. Political 
opportunity structure is represented by larger political factors, such as the Orange 
revolution, party mobilization – interpreted as the actions that political parties take 
to get people to vote or to otherwise support party goals – and political corruption. 
Economics and politics are often connected – thus, in each I will occasionally 
present economic or political indicators, as appropriate. 
Economic Context for Youth by ESS Fieldwork Periods
Based on the previous research (Gurr 1968; Wilkes 2004; Dalton et al 2010 Ortiz 
et al. 2013, Solt 2015), for the analysis of sources of grievance for Ukrainian 
youth I use macroeconomic indicators of GDP per capita growth (annual %), GINI 
index, overall level of unemployment (%), 25–29 years old unemployment (%) 
and higher education enrolment (ISCED 6 to 8). Considering that macroeconomic 
change could not be automatically transformed into deprivation and grievance, 
I further analyse economic situation in detail, describing economic context for 
each fi eldwork period of ESS.
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Ukrainian economy had experienced one of the world’s largest economic 
downturns after the deployment of a new round of fi nancial and economic crisis in 
2008. In 2009 Ukrainian GDP per capita growth had reached its critical negative 
point (-14.4%) (Table 2). General level of unemployment had increased to 9.6% in 
2009. Starting from 2009 the level of youth unemployment remained substantially 
higher than overall statistics and higher education enrolment had been declining 
since 2008 that potentially makes this category of society more perceptional to 
grievance. 
Table 2. Socio-economic indicators in percent
Indicator 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GDP per capita growth 
(annual %) 12.9 3.46 8.03 8.55 2.86 -14.42 4.61 5.85 0.49 0.20
GINI Index 29 29 29.8 27 26.6 25.3 24.8 24.5 24.7 24.5
Overall unemployment 
(%) 9.2 7.8 7.4 6.9 6.4 9.6 8.8 8.6 8.1 7.7
25–29 years old 
unemployment (%) 9.3 7.6 7.3 6.9 7.0 10.4 9.9 9.2 9.5 8.7
Higher education 
enrollment 
(ISCED 6 to 8)a
69,6 75,1 78,7 81,1 79,2 77,8 74,9 64,7 65,0 69,6
Note: Data from World Bank Data (GDP per capita growth; GINI Index; Higher education enrollment) and State 
Statistics Service of Ukraine (25–29 years old unemployment)  
a Data about higher education enrollment is calculated as total enrolment in higher education (ISCED 6 to 8) 
of the fi ve-year age group following on from secondary school leaving.
In further sections I provide description of potential sources of socio-economic 
grievance per each period of ESS. I analyze statistical data and available literature 
that provides details on socio-economic context of youth during 2004–2013 time 
period. The analyses suggest that there were potential grievances during 2009 
economic crises. However, the mass political mobilization during 2004 Orange 
Revolution also had its socio-economic roots in illegal privatization and corruption, 
unbalanced economic development and growing geographic disparities in income. 
Economy: 2004–2005
After prolonged recession in 1990s, Ukrainian economy started its positive growth 
only in 1999 and in 2004 had reached the highest rates of GDP per capita growth 
in post-socialist period. According to GINI Index, inequality in distribution of 
income among households had declined from 39.3% in 1995 to 29% in 2004–
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2005. Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population) had 
also declined from 5.4% in 1995 to 0.6% in 2004 (World Bank Data). 
The unemployment situation for Ukrainians before the fi rst ESS fi eldwork 
period of late winter 2005 was in a period of decreases. In 2000–2004 the number of 
unemployed had decreased from 12.4% to 9.2% of economically active population 
(7.8% in 2005). The number of unemployed in 2004 between youth cohorts was 
9.3% for 25–29 year olds (in 2005 it further decreased to 7.6%). (State Statistics 
Service of Ukraine). 
At the beginning of 2000s the Ukrainian economy had experienced important 
economic transformations that could have contributed to the Orange Revolution 
in November 2004–January 2005. First, big enterprises were denationalised in 
2003–2004 and went to regime insiders. A wave of ‘illegal and covert privatisation 
of production facilities, research institutes, communal housing trade outlets and 
natural resources that developed on the eve of the 2004 presidential election and 
carried on right up to the fi nal round of voting followed’ (Bojcun 2011). Second, 
the processes of unregulated expansion of the exporting sectors became one of the 
reasons for the socio-political crisis in Ukraine at the end of 2004 and was the direct 
result of chronic ineffectiveness of the socio-economic strategy of sustainable 
development (Zhalilo 2009). Third, big enterprises avoided their tax obligations 
through corrupt agreements between fi rms and regional taxation authorities 
that lead to concentration of capital in certain ‘oligarchic clans’ connected with 
political elites (Bojcun 2011). Finally, by October 2004, regional disparities in 
mean income had reached its critical point (700 hryvnias per month in Eastern 
regions and 400 hryvnias per month in Western regions) that could explain why 
more rural and urban workers from the Central and Western regions tended to 
support the Orange camp (Viktor Yushchenko), and the industrial workers of 
Eastern and Southern Ukraine supported the camp of Viktor Yanukovych during 
Orange revolution (Mykhnenko 2009). According to Bojcun (2016), writing for 
the Commons Journal, [1] ‘The mounting social and regional economic inequalities 
and an increasingly repressive regime were the triggers for the 2004 Orange 
Revolution’. By 2005 there was a decline in GDP per capita from 12.9 percent to 
3.4 percent (Bojcun 2011).
During 1990–2005, the number of students in Ukrainian universities had 
increased from 170 to 466 per 10 thousands of people (Oksamytna 2010, 166). 
Also, during this time period, the number of higher educational institutions had 
increased from 891 to 966. Higher education was expanding predominantly 
through the emergence and development of the private sector. After the collapse 
of socialist block, 126 private universities were created (State Statistics Service 
of Ukraine). In addition to private universities, public ones had started to provide 
fee-based services.
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Economy: 2006–2007
ESS Ukraine 2006 was actually collected in the end of that year (December) and 
into early 2007, a period of rising economic growth. Comparing to 2005, GDP per 
capita growth had increased from 3.4 to 8 percent in 2006 and reached 8.5 percent 
in 2007. At that point Ukraine had experienced eight years of GDP growth from 
the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2007 (Bojcun 2011). 
In 2007 a sign of economic overheating was already appearing as commercial 
banks took larger amounts of short-term foreign credits to pass on as loans. Foreign 
direct investments in Ukraine rose sharply from a $1.7 billion net infl ow in 2004 to 
$9.2 billion in 2007. At the end of 2007 the National Bank of Ukraine responded 
to overheating by limiting the short-term loans commercial banks could take from 
abroad (Bojcun 2011).
ESS respondents saw an extended period of decreasing unemployment. The 
number of the unemployed of all ages continued to decrease from 7.8% in 2005 
to 7.4% in 2006 and 6.9% in 2007. For youth (25–29 years old) unemployment 
had decreased at about the same percent. However, the share of unemployed after 
graduation from secondary and higher education institutions in general number 
of unemployed had increased in one point (from 16.3% in 2005 to 17.4% in 
2007).  Real average monthly salary for all ages comparing to previous year had 
decreased from 120.3% in 2005 to 118.3% in 2006 and 112.5% in 2007 (State 
Statistics Service of Ukraine).
The number of students in 2006/2007 had increased to 2.7 million people 
comparing to 2004/2005 (2.6 million people), when the number of higher 
educational institutions had decreased from 966 to 951 (State Statistics Service of 
Ukraine). Generally, government expenditure on education, expressed as percent 
of total government expenditure, had increased slightly from 12.8% in 2004 to 
14% in 2007. However, government expenditure per tertiary student (expressed 
as percent of GDP per capita) in 2006 had remained stable comparing to previous 
year (32.3%), and in 2007 had decreased to 30.5% (World Bank Data).  
Economy: 2008–2009
ESS Ukraine fi eldwork for 2008 was actually in the fi rst month of Spring 2009, 
when the Ukrainian economy had experienced ‘one of the world’s largest 
economic downturns’ (Kravchuk 2015: 5). GDP per capita growth had fallen 
from 8.5 percent in 2007 to 2.8 percent in 2008 and in 2009 had reached its 
critical negative point (-14.4 percent). The annual decrease in GDP in 2009 
was 15.1 percent (World Bank Data). The share of foreign capital in Ukraine’s 
banks grew from 13 percent in 2004 to over 50 percent in 2009, but as Bojcun 
(2011) emphasizes foreign capital did not go into technologically upgrading 
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and diversifying the economy, except in a very limited way. By April 2009 
seven of the largest ten banks were foreign-owned. According to Bojcun 
(2011), by 2008 Russian private investors occupied commanding positions 
in non-ferrous metallurgy, petroleum refi ning and petrochemicals and mobile 
telecommunication, and had strong positions in iron, steel and the dairy industry 
as well as fi nancial sector. From August 2008 the collapse of Ukraine’s foreign 
trade and the seizure of its banking system prompted massive capital outfl ows, 
leaving net FDI at $6.2 billion for the year as a whole. Crises deepened in the 
fourth quarter of 2008 and there was no domestic demand to replace it. As the 
result, Ukrainian economy had experienced stagfl ation: from September 2008 
the hryvnia steadily devalued (Bojcun 2011). 
The government’s response to the crisis in 2009 can be summarised as follows: 
The Cabinet led by Yulia Tymoshenko, and supported by the President Yushchenko, 
took the IMF loan and made it the key point of its strategy to combat the impact of 
the fi nancial crises on the economy and state fi nances. The failure of Tymoshenko’s 
government to deal adequately with the crisis during 2009 contributed to her defeat 
in the 2010 presidential elections (Bojcun 2011).
Preparation of the 2009 state budget showed a shortfall of approximately 
$17 billion in meeting social welfare payments (Bojcun 2011). Sharp economic 
downturn had other consequences: growing indefi nite layoffs and unemployment 
reaching 9.6 percent in 2009, mounting wage arrears, deepening household 
indebtedness and persistent price infl ation of essential consumer goods (Bojcun 
2011). 
Young people suffered heavily from the economic crisis. According to 
government statistics, for the 25–29 age cohort unemployment reached 10.4% 
in 2009. The share of unemployed after graduation from secondary and higher 
education institutions in general number of unemployed had increased to 18.3% 
in 2008, but in 2009 it decreased to 14.1% (State Statistics Service of Ukraine).
During the economic crisis, the number of students in 2008/2009 had increased 
from 2.6 to 2.8 million, though the number of universities decreased from 951 
in 2006/2007 to 904 in 2008/2009 (State Statistics Service of Ukraine). In 2008, 
government expenditure on education expressed as percent of total government 
expenditure) had slightly decreased to 13.6%. In 2009, it had reached 15%, which 
was the highest point during post-socialist period. 
From 2007 to 2009 the government increased its expenditures per tertiary 
student (expressed as percent of GDP per capita) from 30.5 percent in 2007 to 39 
percent in 2009 (World Bank Data). This relative increase in expenditures helped to 
neutralize negative consequences of economic crises for students, however it does 
not indicate improvement in real socio-economic conditions of youth considering 
negative GDP growth in 2009.  
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Economy: 2010–2011
ESS Ukraine 2010 was actually fi elded in late summer 2011, in which respondents 
saw a slow rising economy but rising government debt. In 2010–2011 GDP per 
capita growth had increased to 4.6% in 2010 and 5.8% in 2011 (World Bank Data). 
Accumulation of international loans in 2009–2010 had led to a threatening situation 
in 2011, when Ukrainian state debt reached $59.2 bln (comparing to $24.6 bln 
in 2008). What is more, in 2010 Ukrainian budget had experienced signifi cant 
defi cit – the share of expenses coverage by income was only 83% (95% in 2011) 
(Kravchuk 2015).  
ESS respondents also saw small decreases in unemployment. General level of 
unemployment had decreased to 8.8% in 2010 and to 8.6% in 2011. The level of 
youth unemployment reminded higher than average (9.9% in 2010 and 9.2% in 
2011) and the category of ‘unemployed after graduation from secondary and higher 
education institutions’ had increased its share in general number of unemployed 
during those years to 16.2% in 2010 and 18.7% in 2011 (State Statistics Service 
of Ukraine). 
During this period, youth in Ukraine saw fewer students and fewer universities 
than in the previous period. In 2010/2011 the number of students started to decrease, 
reaching 2.5 million of people and the number of universities had furtherly 
decreased to 854 (State Statistics Service of Ukraine). Government expenditure 
on education (% of government expenditure) had also decreased to 13.4% when 
government expenditures per tertiary student had decreased by 1% comparing to 
2009 (World Bank Data). 
Economy: 2012–2013
ESS Ukraine 2012 was actually in the middle of summer 2013; this would be the 
last ESS fi eldwork in Ukraine for a long time. The economy was slow growing 
and government debt rose. GDP per capita growth had again decreased to 0.5% in 
2012 and 0.2% in 2013 (World Bank Data). After 2009 the negative trade surplus 
increased annually, reaching a mark of $ 15 billion in 2012. Ukrainian public debt 
increased to $64.5 bln in 2012 and to $73.2 bln in 2013. The situation with defi cit 
of Ukrainian budget also get worse. The share of expenses coverage by budget 
incomes had declined to 90% in 2012 and to 88% in 2013 (World Bank Data). [2] 
The level of unemployment had decreased to 8.1% in 2012 and 7.7% in 2013. 
Young people had remained more vulnerable category of society comparing to the 
average level of unemployment. For 25–29 age cohort the level of unemployment 
was 9.5% in 2012. In 2013 it had slightly decreased, but still reminded higher than 
the average level (8.7%) (State Statistics Service of Ukraine). 
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Students and universities decreased in number. In 2012–2013 the number of 
students had decreased to 2170.1 thousands of people and number of universities 
had decreased to 823 (State Statistics Service of Ukraine). Government expenditure 
on education (% of government expenditure) had remained stable when government 
expenditures per tertiary student (% of GDP per capita) had increased to 41.4% 
in 2012 and 43.8% in 2013 (World Bank Data). In 2012 new law on budget 
reallocation in higher education was implemented, according to which the number 
of funded places were decreased for social sciences, law and business and increased 
for computer science and technical fi elds (Orlova 2013, 13).
Youth Political Opportunity Structure by ESS Fieldwork Periods 
In this section I explore the political opportunity structure for youth political 
mobilization during ESS fi eldwork periods. I focus on the interests in protest 
mobilization of main political players and parties and their actions towards youth. 
What constitutes a political opportunity structure is not widely shared, though 
there are some commonalities across studies (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). I focus 
somewhat narrowly on policies oriented on youth, youth political orientations, 
changes in the number of youth organizations, and specifi c events in youth activism. 
I analyze the main protest events with participation of youth based on Ukrainian 
Protest and Coercion Data project organized by Center for Social and Labor 
Research. This project is a publicly available source of information about protest 
events in Ukraine. Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data project database contain 
information about all protest events that have happened in Ukraine reported by 
Ukrainian web-media in 2010–2016, of which the research group selected more 
than 190 , regardless of their size and demands. 
Among a number of indicators, the data includes the time (event start date, event 
end date, date of the week), place (oblast, region, location) and type of the events 
(preempt, rally, picket, search, negotiation, strike etc.), as well as information 
about participants (workers, pensioners, local authorities, citizens, teachers, 
students, small businesses etc.) and their demands (social-economic, ideological/
regional identity, political, civic rights. According to the website [https://cslr.
org.ua/en/methodology/], the project was supported by National Endowment for 
Democracy and International Fund “Vidrodzhennya”. Detailed information about 
methodology of Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data project could be found in 
Ishchenko (2016) article.
In following sections I provide detailed description of political opportunity 
structure for youth mobilization for each ESS Ukraine fi eldwork period. 
Descriptions are based on available statistical data, local surveys and protest 
event data. These data have limits, as some indicators such as the number of 
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youth organizations and student protest events are not comparable across time. 
The data do not include information about other possible sources of mobilization, 
such as changes to technological forces. The internet deserves a mention, 
however. According to World Bank data, percentage of individuals using Internet 
in Ukraine had substantially increased from 3.5 percent in 2014 to 40.9 percent 
in 2013. For youth, that are more engaged in using of Internet and social media, 
this developments in access to technology had created new space for getting 
information and political organization via social media as well as opened new 
opportunities for political parties and other political actors to use Internet as 
a mechanism for political mobilization or propaganda.   
Politics: 2004–2005 
Of all events that could have had an outsized impact on how all age groups in 
ESS Ukraine reported their political participation and their trust in institutions, 
the Orange Revolution was by far the largest and most important. The Orange 
Revolution was from late November 2004 to January 2005, and the ESS Ukraine 
fi eldwork period was right on its heels, being from late January 2005 to mid-
March, 2005. 
Demonstrations started in the aftermath of the run-off vote of the 2004 
presidential election that was eventually won by Viktor Yanukovych, the incumbent 
prime minister from the Party of Regions. As the result of political crises and 
mass protest events, the election was re-run in January 2005 and opposition leader 
Viktor Yushchenko was declared the President (Wilson 2009). 
Both Orange forces (opposition political parties) and blue ones, which were 
for the Party of Regions, played a key role in the mobilization of youth protesters. 
Those under 30 years old were three times more likely to be politically engaged 
in Orange Revolution comparing to other age cohorts (Kuzio, 2006).  Qualitative 
research by Tereshchenko (2010) suggests that youth ‘conceptualizations of, and 
emotional and practical responses to, the Orange Revolution were interlinked 
with regional differences’ (Tereshchenko 2010: 99–100). Young people from 
Western Ukraine were more engaged and active in oppositional protests of Orange 
Revolution comparing to youth from Eastern Ukraine that could be explained by 
regional disparities in voting preferences (Viktor Yushchenko had more support in 
the West, when Viktor Yanukovych in the East). 
Politics: 2006–2007 
ESS Ukraine was fi elded in December, 2006 to January 2007, well after the March 
2006 Ukrainian parliamentary elections. Following the Orange Revolution and 
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2004 presidential elections, the Ukrainian parliament transferred some power from 
the president to the parliament. As the result of the elections, Party of Regions 
recieved 32.1 percent of votes, when Our Ukraine Bloc (party of current president 
Viktor Yushchenko) only 14 percent. The second largest party in parliament was 
the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc that received 22.3 percent of votes. 
After 2006 elections Party of Regions (PoR) received 186/450 votes and 
became the leading party in the parliament. PoR had their youth-wing organization 
since 2002. Considering their youth-oriented policies, party declared in their 
offi cial program to support at least 75% budgeted places in higher educational 
institutions, a minimum-wage student stipend, a minimum 20% annual raise in 
educator salaries and universal Internet access. In labour policy, PoR declared to 
provide internships for students and support in fi nding the fi rst job. [3] However, 
those social promises had more declarative character as none of them were fully 
implemented during PoR government that could be one of the reasons of further 
distrust in the party. 
Politics: 2008–2009 
The ESS fi eldwork period was March 2009 to April, 2009. Just before that, the 
number of youth and children organizations in Ukraine had increased (from 176 
in 2007 to 200 in 2008 and 221 in 2009; see Libanova 2010). However, the share 
of those organizations in the total number of non-governmental organizations had 
been declining from 13.5% in 2005 to 12.9% in 2008 and 12.6% in 2009 (Libanova 
2010). 
In 2008 there were demonstrations (marches, protest assemblies and occupations) 
both for and against the idea of Ukraine being affi liated with NATO (Ortiz et al 
2013). The PoR, long building its youth wing, supported demonstrations against 
NATO with thousands of participants. Joining PoR was the Communist Party 
of Ukraine. At the same time, some smaller marches for affi liation with NATO 
with young participants took place in Western regions of Ukraine. Those marches 
supported by Our Ukraine and Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, whose representatives 
(President Viktor Yushchenko, Premier-minister Yulia Tymoshenko and head of 
Parliament Areseniy Yatseniuk) initiated a joint statement on the possibility of 
Ukraine joining the NATO Membership Action Plan. In autumn 2009 also began 
strikes against wage arrears and layoffs, and there were protest marches organised 
by the trade unions against poverty (Bojcun 2011). 
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Politics: 2010–2011 
In this section I include the protest event data from the Ukrainian Protest and 
Coercion Data project that has data starting in 2009.
ESS Ukraine “2010” was actually fi elded May 2011 to July 2011. There were 
several political events that could have had a distant infl uence on respondents’ 
reports of their political participation and trust in institutions. 
In January-February 2010 there were presidential elections in Ukraine. After 
the fi rst round, competition between two candidates – opposition leader Viktor 
Yanukovych and prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko – had ended with the victory 
of Yanukovych. In both election rounds, both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko won 
around 20 percent of the youth vote (Balakireva 2010).
Compared with the election period, after the second round of the presidential 
election (February 2010), the number of protest events with student participants 
increased by nearly twice. The fi rst increase in the number of student protests was 
in March. The Spring surge of protest activity is associated with the beginning of 
a series of actions against the appointment of Dmytro Tabachnyk as Minister of 
Education and Science of Ukraine (Korchak 2011). In the fall of 2010, student 
protests intensifi ed, and one of the most common themes of these protests was 
the introduction of paid services in educational institutions (Korchak 2011). This 
intensifi cation in student movement is not refl ected in ESS data collected in 2011 
as it does not show any raise in young people’s participation in demonstrations 
during that time. 
In addition, in 2010 public protests against attempts of employers to reduce 
their expenditures and increase the standard of labour exploitation, non-payment of 
wages, violation of collective agreements and factory closures became widespread 
(Bojcun 2011). 
Politics: 2012–2013 
Here, we should actually begin in October 2011, some months after ESS Ukraine 
“2010” fi eldwork was completed and before ESS Ukraine 2012, which was 
actually in Summer 2013.
In October 2011, some months after the fi eldwork of ESS in Ukraine was 
completed, there were series of student actions against ‘anti-Ukrainian’ position 
of Dmytro Tabachnyk in Kharkiv, Lugansk, Kyiv, Odesa and Khmelnitsky. One 
mass student protest was organised in October by students from Kyiv-Polytechnic 
University against what they argued was corrupt university rector elections 
(Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data project database 2011).  
At the same time, we can see activation of right-wing groups in dealing with 
youth problems. In October 2011 right-wing groups and organizations protested 
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for provision of cheap apartments for young people in Kyiv and Khmelnitsky. 
In November 2011, in Ternopil the Youth Nationalist Congress held a theatrical 
performance on the same topic titled “Youth Housing for a freebie”, when in 
Chernivtsi the police tried to prevent a nationalist organization’s action held on 
the occasion of the Student’s Day (Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data project 
database 2011).
The 2012–2013 period could be characterised as radicalization of youth 
political participation from different ideological camps. For example, on January 
20, 2012, people who presented themselves as a “youth wing” of the Party of 
Regions protested in Olexandria (Kropyvnytskyi Oblast). On January 29 in Kyiv, 
the police defended several hundred supporters of the all-Ukrainian union Svoboda 
(nationalist political party) from a few dozen anti-fascists and 27 young people 
who met the march of Svoboda with the slogans “Fascism will not pass!” were 
arrested in the city centre. The right wing continued its protest activities. In May 
2012 two young men “armed” with forks, attacked a photo exhibition picturing the 
daily lives of LGBT families. In January 2013 two young people threw a smoke 
grenade into the room of the fi rst fl oor of the Sumy State University, where students 
from African countries attended in large numbers. Moreover, there was an attack 
on trade union activists after their rally against the exploitation of students and 
raids on student fi lm shows at universities (Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data 
project database 2013).
A new project of law on higher education created by Dmytro Tabachnyk that 
was oriented on the expanding of paid services, produced a new wave of student 
protests in 2012–2013. Later, Dmytro Tabachnyk’s project of law was replaced 
with one that was developed in dialogue with representatives of higher education 
institutions and the student movement (Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data 
project database 2013).
In March 2012, a newly formed coalition of Svoboda, Front of Change, 
Fatherland and Udar political parties, along with local organizations, held a series 
of actions in the 14 regional centres and the city of Yenakievo directed against the 
incumbent president. The organizers of the protest named these actions, “Show the 
Red Card to Yanukovych”. Despite that the campaign was announced in advance, 
and the unconditional relevance of social slogans, on average only 10–20 young 
right-wing people had participated in local protests.
In October 2012 the Ukrainian parliamentary election took place. According 
to the results of election, Party of Regions received 30 percent of votes, when 
Fatherland (including United Opposition) received 25.5 percent of votes. 
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TRENDS IN YOUTH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND TRUST IN 
INSTITUTIONS IN UKRAINE 
In this section I present trends in young adult political participation and trust in 
institutions for Ukraine in every wave of ESS in which Ukraine appears.
Using ESS, I measure political participation through: voted last national 
election; contacted politician or government offi cial, worked in political 
party or action group, worked in another organization or association, worn or 
displayed campaign badge/sticker, signed petition, taken part in lawful public 
demonstration, boycotted certain products, non-electoral participation. For 
indicator of non-electoral participation all variables of political participation 
except voting were recoded as any type of non-electoral participation = 1, 
otherwise = 0. 
Trust in Ukrainian political institutions is operationalised through the next 
indicators: trust in countries’ parliament; trust in the legal system; trust in 
the police; trust in politicians; trust in political parties. Trust in international 
institutions is represented by indicators of trust in the European Union and 
trust in the United Nations. Percentage within indicators of trust in institution 
represents categories 6 to 10 of 11-point scale (where 0 = no trust and 10 = 
complete trust). Youth is defi ned as 18–29 years old. 
The level of youth political participation is generally low across time with some 
exceptions in non-electoral participation in 2005 and voting in 2006 Ukrainian 
parliamentary election (Table 2). Such raise of non-electoral participation in 2005, 
particularly in taking part in lawful public demonstrations (28.4%) and displaying 
campaign badge or sticker (23.6%), is driven by Orange Revolution events in 
Ukraine during which youth were key social group participating in 2004–2005 
protests and political events (Kuzio, 2006).
Table 3. Youth political participation in percent (n in parentheses)
Form of Political Participation 2005 2006/2007 2009 2011 2013
Voted last national election 55.9(185)
75.3
(272)
60.6
(197)
57.8
(171)
55.7
(219)
Contacted politician or government offi cial 5.1(17)
3.9
(14)
5.2
(17)
6.4
(19)
4.3
(17)
Worked in political party or action group 6(20)
3.9
(14)
2.1
(7)
5.1
(15)
3
(12)
Worked in another organization or association 3.9(13)
2.5
(9)
2.8
(9)
2
(6)
2.3
(9)
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Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker 23.6(78)
6.1
(22)
5.2
(17)
5.1
(15)
5.8
(23)
Signed petition 8.8(29)
4.2
(15)
3.1
(10)
2.7
(8)
2.3
(9)
Taken part in lawful public demonstration 28.4(94)
8
(29)
6.1
(20)
5.1
(15)
2.8
(11)
Boycotted certain products 3(10)
1.1
(4)
0.9
(3)
2.4
(7)
0
(0)
Non-electoral participation 39(127)
14.8
(53)
18.2
(58)
15.7
(46)
13.2
(51)
The analyses in Table 3 suggest that the percentage of Ukrainian youth that voted 
last national elections is signifi cantly lower that percentage within older groups. 
This trend is stable across time. The rates of youth non-electoral participation are 
not higher than older age cohorts (Table 4). Trust in parliament does not show 
substantial differences by age (Table 6), with a small exception of young people’s 
lower rates of trust in 2005. 
Table 4. Voted last national elections by age in percent (n) 
Age group 2005 2006/2007 2009 2011 2013
18–29 55.9 (158)
75.3 
(272)
60.6 
(197)
57.8 
(171)
55.7 
(219)
30–45 82.7 (388)
83.2 
(272)
79.4 
(336)
74.7 
(337)
73.8 
(394)
46–60 85.4 (415)
93 
(490)
87.1 
(432)
84.6 
(397)
81.9 
(431)
61+ 87.7 (612)
90.7 
(557)
86.1
(477)
87.3 
(584)
86.2 
(573)
Table 5. Non-electoral participation by age in percent (n) 
Age group 2005 2006/2007 2009 2011 2013
18–29 39 
(127)
14.8
 (53)
18.2 
(58)
15.7 
(46)
13.2 
(51)
30–45 35.8 
(166)
22 
(97)
19.4 
(80)
13.8 
(62)
18.3 
(97)
46–60 35.2 
(170)
21.9 
(113)
21.6 
(105)
17.6 
(82)
14.1 
(73)
61+ 23.1 (158) 16 (96)
17.6 
(96) 15.5 (103)
13.3 
(87)
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Table 6. Youth trust in institutions in percent (n)
Trust in… 2005 2006/2007 2009 2011 2013
Parliament 19(63)
3.9
(14)
4
(13)
4.7
(14)
7.1
(28)
Legal system 19.9(66)
8.6
(31)
7.4
(24)
7.4
(22)
9.9
(39)
Police 13.3(44)
10
(36)
9.8
(32)
9.1
(27)
11.2
(44)
Politicians 9.4(31)
3.6
(13)
0.9
(3)
3
(9)
5.8
(23)
Political parties 10.3(34)
4.4
(16)
1.8
(6)
3
(9)
6.6
(26)
European Union 26.9(89)
18.8
(68)
21.2
(69)
21.6
(64)
24.9
(98)
United Nations 27.5(91)
18.3
(66)
17.8
(58)
22.3
(66)
22.4
(88)
Table 7. Trust in parliament by age in percent (n)
Age group 2005 2006/2007 2009 2011 2013
18–29 19 (63)
3.9 
(14)
4 
(13)
4.7
(14)
7.1 
(28)
30–45 26 (122)
3.8 
(17)
3.3 
(14)
2.7 
(12)
5.4 
(29)
46–60 26.5 (129)
8.2 
(43)
4.4 
(22)
5.3 
(25)
6.6 
(35)
61+ 34.1 (238)
13 
(80)
5.2 
(29)
9.7
 (65)
7.2 
(48)
As with political participation, youth trust in Ukrainian institutions is 
tremendously low across time. The exception is 2005, when trust in parliament 
and legal system had reached almost 20% and trust in politicians and political 
parties had reached around 10% (Table 6). Such relatively positive evaluations of 
political institutions in 2005 are most probably connected with youth satisfaction 
with shirt-term outcomes of Orange Revolution events. However, youth trust in 
parliament is lower comparing to older age cohorts across time (Table 7). Trust in 
international institutions (EU and UN) is noticeably higher than in Ukrainian ones. 
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CONCLUSION
In this article I analysed the economic and political conditions of youth political 
participation and institutional trust in Ukraine in 2004–2013 and matched them 
to European Social Survey fi eldwork dates. The purpose was to better understand 
trends the potential sources of economic grievance and possibilities for building 
political opportunity structure. Since the theories of economic grievance and 
political opportunity structure are often examined using survey data, and since the 
context of the fi eldwork period should infl uence respondents’ answers, I mapped 
these potential sources to the specifi c ESS fi eldwork periods.
The full test of grievance theory is beyond the scope of this paper, but the 
evidence suggests that the periods of macro-level grievance indicators do not align 
with trends in political participation. As Figure 1 shows, economic downturn in 
2009 did not have any substantial infl uence on voting or non-electoral participation. 
Figure 1. Youth voting, non-electoral participation GDP growth and unemployment, 
percentage
Note: Own calculations based on ESS 2004–2012, World Bank Data, State Statistics Service of Ukraine
General low level of youth political participation in Ukraine during post-socialist 
transformations is fairly expected in the context of neoliberal policies, from which 
youth suffered substantially in terms of access to labour market and students’ 
living conditions. High rates of political participation in 2005 could be explained 
by macropolitical factors of mass protests mobilisation and building political 
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opportunity structure during rotation of political elites in Orange Revolution. In 
the context of substantial economic grievance, such mass mobilization was driven 
rather by political parties in their struggles for taking power and their need in 
wider political support than by grassroots movements. For instance, despite of 
development of student movement in 2010–2013, supported predominantly by 
youth organisations, general level of youth non-electoral political participation 
did not reach even close level to 2005. On the contrary, it continued to decrease 
according to ESS data (Table 3). 
It is not easy to clearly and elegantly connect the above sources of grievance 
with youth political participation in Ukraine during the periods of ESS fi eldworks. 
Some macro-economic indicators that had direct impact on youth were not 
immediately translated into strife.  For instance, during 2008–2009 the level of 
youth unemployment was the highest after fi nancial crises and thus the youth had 
appeared to be at their most deprived. At the same time, in 2004 and 2013 macro-
economic indicators were not dramatically declining, while the high-profi le issues 
of failed domestic and international economic policies, corruption and uneven 
redistribution of income constituted a general context of substantial grievance 
which perhaps contributed to the mobilization of young protesters during the 
Orange Revolution and the events of Euromaidan.   
NOTES
1   According to the website [https://commons.com.ua/en/p/pro-nas/] the Journal of 
social criticism ‘Commons’ is a Ukrainian left intellectual edition, founded in 2009.
2  According to Bojcun (2016), ‘the Maidan arose in 2013, as it did in 2004, because 
the new Ukrainian ruling class failed to share state power democratically or to invest 
in the development of its own society’. The period of Euromaidan events is not 
covered by the fi eldwork of ESS.
3  Party of Regions also wanted to fully subsidize employment of the disabled, orphans 
and single mothers and provide training to the unemployed for occupations with 
labour shortages.
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